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Implications for Foreign Direct
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Under the African Growth Opportunity
Act
Rebecca Trent*
When you look at the World
What is it that you see?
People find all kinds of things
That bring them to their knees...
-- U2
FALL 2002 POSTSCRIPT
Since completing this paper in the spring of 2002, much has happened
in the global arena with respect to investment, aid, trade, and development
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to Gabriel Gabiro and friends in East Africa who showed me (whether they know it or not)
that when Things Fall Apart they can certainly be put back together again. Thanks to my
parents for riding the roller coaster with me, and to Ms. Jacobs for pointing out that there is
virtue in simplicity.
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in Sub-Saharan Africa. To cover all the events as they relate to the African
Growth Opportunity Act"("AGOA") in detail would necessitate an entirely
new paper, or perhaps, papers. I have left the original text of this comment
virtually untouched because it serves as a benchmark from which to assess
progress on initiatives undertaken in the AGOA to promote foreign direct
investment in burgeoning African economies that so badly need increased
capital flows.
These are tumultuous times, and in recent months everything from
homeland terrorist alerts, to corporate scandals, to the presence of the Irish
rock star Bono touring Africa with American Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill' has given new credence to the phrase "expect the unexpected."
Indeed, the post 9/11 world, a world plagued with unforeseen economic and
geo-political crises, has tested the bonds and fissures of our global commu-
nity. In the midst of all the chaos, there have been several key develop-
ments that will impact foreign direct investment, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The resolve of world leaders to promote a world of shared
prosperity, albeit with strict conditions, was highlighted in June, 2002 when
G-8 2 nations pledged billions of dollars in a program called the New Part-
nership for Africa's Development, which aims to provide grants and pro-
mote foreign investment in African nations.
In late August and early September, 2002, the United Nations World
Summit on Sustainable Development took place in Johannesburg. At the
Summit, African nations asserted their autonomy by announcing the forma-
tion of the African Union and by requesting that poorer states in the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") be given the right to retaliate collectively
against rich powers in disputes.4 With respect to the United States specifi-
cally, President Bush was granted "fast track" Trade Promotion Authority
by Congress in August, and he signed a farm bill that grants subsidies to
U.S. farmers in May that will likely have detrimental effects on Africa's
economic competitiveness for agricultural products. 5 Indeed, events in re-
1 Helping the Poor: Of Celebrities, Charities, and Trade, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002 at 74
("It was an odd spectacle: American finance ministers do not often hang out in African
slums, and rock stars rarely take part in roundtable discussions about development econom-
ics... The question is, can the celebrity-charity alliance persuade voters that rich country pro-
tection hurts the poor?")
2 The G-8 nations include the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, and Russia.
See David E. Sanger, G-8 Adopts African Aid Package, With Strict Conditions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/intemational/africa.
4 See Host Country Official Site for the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable
Development, at http://www.joburgsummit2002.com/Jowsco/index.html (last visited Octo-
ber 16, 2002).
5 See Daniel Guido, Senate Approves 'Fast Track' Trade Authority For President, at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/8/1/191151.shtml (last visited October 16,
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cent months illustrate that the backdrop for foreign direct investment in
Sub-Saharan Africa is marked by a series of radical ups and downs with no
clear stabilization in sight.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A
WORLD OF SELECTIVE GLOBALIZATION
"Globalization" is a term that will forever be associated with the boom-
ing silicon era of the late 1990s: the word attempts to capture the "inter-
connectedness" of a world linked by high-speed internet connections,
global telecommunications, and a zeal to capitalize on profitable waves of
emerging markets. While the essence of a "globalized" world is one in
which all countries and peoples are connected, the results of globalization
have tended to divide rather than unite, and to increase the disparity be-
tween rich and poor rather than level the playing field.6 Indeed, a "Special
Report on Globalization" in the Economist noted that "2 billion people live
in countries that have become less rather than more globalized. In these
countries-including ... much of Africa-trade has diminished in relation
to national income, economic growth has been stagnant, and poverty has
risen."7 While wealthy nations have reaped the benefits of globalization,
nearly one third of the world has not been a part of the process, 8 a process,
which, from the very root of the term coined to describe it, implies the exis-
tence of a forum, a world economy, in which everyone gets to participate.
In the wake of the September 11 th attacks on the United States, there
has been an outcry in the media over the economic, social, and political
rights of individuals in less developed nations.9 The need to integrate de-
veloping nations into the global economy has been called for, not only for
sheer humanitarian reasons, but also as a means to prevent catastrophic ac-
tions by those who feel left out when it comes to globalization.' ° It is said
2002).
6 See Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Inte-
grating Developing Countries, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 25, 32 (2001). Monshipouri
points out that concentrations of wealth stemming from globalization are evident, not only
between nations of the North and South, but also within developing nations. Wealth that
does reach nations of the South is often concentrated and therefore only benefits a certain
strata of the population: "Even those analysts who stress the tremendous potential benefits
that globalization has for developing countries, warn about the ways in which globalization
exacerbates inequality and heightens social tensions.. .Globalization-in particular, privati-
zation-presents considerable risks of concentration of wealth unless undertaken with effec-
tive regulation." Id.
7 Special Report on Globalisation: Is it at Risk?, ECONOMIST, February 2, 2002, at 73
[hereinafter Special Report].
8Id.
9 See Lael Brianard, Textiles and Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001; Richard Solkol-
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that "rich countries will pay a price"" if they cannot find ways to integrate
developing nations into the international economy and that "security de-
pends on the idea that others [meaning lesser developed nations] have a
stake in our international system."'12 While some critics argue that integra-
tion of developing nations can be achieved through revised foreign aid pro-
grams and debt forgiveness, 13 such programs do not foster the sort of
autonomy that is needed for these nations to truly become viable players in
the global market. Debt forgiveness, such as that required by the latest
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative ("HIPC") is essential.14 More-
over, foreign aid is needed to assist nascent development initiatives across
the globe. Debt forgiveness and aid, however, are only the first elements
needed to solve the disparities created by globalization.' 5 If integrated mar-
kets within a truly globalized world are to be sustained, foreign direct in-
vestment and free trade will need to become a reality.' 6 This paper will
focus on the United States' relation to the former by examining implications
for foreign direct investment under a piece of Congressional legislation en-
titled the African Growth Opportunity Act ("AGOA"). 7 Ultimately this
paper illustrates that foreign direct investment will benefit from a universal
policy 18 that offers broad accessibility and transparency to investors, while
"See Special Report, supra note 7.12 See Brianard, supra n. 9; Solkolsky & McMillian, supra note 9.
'3 See id.
14 See Debt Relief under Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative: A Factsheet,
at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/hipic.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2002). The HIPC
Initiative aims at giving debt relief to some of the world's most heavily burdened economies.
For a history of the developments and current status of HIPC Initiatives see generally Eric.
A. Friedman, Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step in a Long Journey, 3 YALE HuM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 191 (2000).
15 See generally, J. M. Migai Akech, The African Growth Opportunity Act: Implications
for Kenya's Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 651 (2001).
16 For the latest discussion on sustainable development see discussion of UNCTAD report
on FDI infra Part II.C, and discussion on Doha trade talks infra Part III.
17 "The African Growth Opportunity Act" is a sub-section of the Trade and Development
Act of 2000, 106 P.L. 200, 114 Stat. 251 (May 18, 2000).
18 It has been suggested that bilateral trade agreements will be a productive bi-product of
the AGOA legislation. See Akech, supra note 15, at 701. While bilateral trade agreements
are a means to strengthen ties between individual African nations and the United States, and
while such agreements are necessarily catered to each specific country, they are not a substi-
tute for a broad commitment to a universal trade and development policy. Negotiating such
agreements is time consuming, and researching each agreement is costly for investors.
Moreover, some African nations have better infrastructure and a wider base of natural re-
sources than others. Bi-lateral investment treaties, while a good option, should be only one
part of a universal trade and development program for Africa. For more information on bi-
lateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment in developing nations see Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 373 (1998) [hereinafter Sustainable Liberalism]; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment
Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36
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simultaneously preserving individual nuances and recognizing the auton-
omy of each unique nation in Sub-Saharan Africa. 19
The AGOA's policy to promote trade development and private sector
investment has important implications for foreign direct investment ("FDI")
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper begins with an overview of the eco-
nomic situation in Sub-Saharan Africa as it exists today. Part II examines
the current state of FDI in general and then in particular as it exists in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Part III moves backwards historically from a specific dis-
cussion of FDI today to a broader examination of previous privatization ini-
tiatives, known as structural adjustment programs ("SAPs"), instituted by
multilateral lending institutions. By looking back at prior efforts to liberal-
ize investment in Africa, Part III articulates the downfalls of SAPs imposed
by multilateral lending institutions. The premise of Part III is that SAPs
have depleted rather than bolstered investment in many African economies
and therefore should not be duplicated in future trade and investment legis-
lation. In addition to critiquing SAPs, Part III also traces the participatory
role of Sub-Saharan African nations in the governing policies of global
trade and development institutions.
After outlining the current status of FDI in Part II and the status of
Sub-Saharan African economies after structural adjustment in Part III, Parts
IV and V move to a study of the specific impact the AGOA will have on
FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa. Part IV explores the policy rationale behind the
Act. Part V examines, in depth, different sections of the AGOA, noting
which sections are likely to achieve the goal of promoting more FDI. Such
sections include the provisions that deal with regionalism, the Economic
Forum, investment dispute mechanisms, working conditions, and commer-
cial trade representatives and employees. The second half of Part V is a
critical analysis of different sections of the Act that will likely not achieve
the goal of bringing more foreign direct investment, and hence sustained
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 (1998) [hereinafter Investment Liberalization].19 The countries of sub-Saharan Africa have since been defined in the African Growth
Opportunity Act ("AGOA") as
the following countries or any successor political entities: Republic of Angola, Republic of Benin,
Republic of Botswana, Burkina Faso, Republic of Burundi, Republic of Cameroon, Republic of
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Republic of Chad, Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Cote d'lvoire, Republic of
Djibouti, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, State of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabonese Republic, Republic of
Gambia, Republic of Ghana, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Kenya,
Kingdom of Lesotho, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mali, Islamic Re-
public of Mauritania, Republic of Mauritius, Republic of Mozambique, Republic of Nambia, Repub-
lic of Niger, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Republic of Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Sao Tome
and Principe, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Seychelles, Republic of Sierra Leone, Somalia, Re-
public of South Africa, Republic of Sudan, Kingdom of Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania,
Republic of Togo, Republic of Uganda, Republic of Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe.
See Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, at § 107.
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development, to the region. In particular, the degree of executive discretion
and debt relief initiatives that dangerously mirror unsuccessful SAPs cre-
ated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund ("IMF") are criti-
cized. In conclusion, Part VI suggests several modes of selective
government intervention and privatization that will promote state agency
while simultaneously advancing the goals of both developed and develop-
ing nations to increase the flows of foreign direct investment to sub-Saharan
Africa.
II. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE PRESENT STATUS OF FDI
GLOBALLY AND FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE INFLOWS OF FDI TO
DEVELOPING NATIONS, PARTICULARLY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A. FDI Defined
Definitions for FDI can vary depending on the legal instrument being
used, and the country asserting the definition. In defining FDI, multilateral
institutions focus on the management characteristic asserted by the home
(investing) country. For example, the WTO secretariat says that FDI "oc-
curs when an investor in one country (the home country) acquires an asset
in another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset.
The management dimension is what FDI distinguishes from portfolio in-
vestment in foreign stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments.,,20 Simi-
larly, the IMF defines FDI as an "investment that is made to acquire a
lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of
an investor, the investor's purpose being to have an effective choice in
management enterprise. 2 1 The definition of foreign direct investment pre-
sents an interesting dichotomy. On one hand, bringing investment funds di-
rectly to developing nations and their emerging markets offers a surge in
capital, and the economy of the developing nation seeks to benefit, through
increased opportunities for labor and training, from the presence of large
multi-national enterprises. 22 On the other hand, the definition of foreign di-
rect investment illustrates that the management of the investment does not
rest with the host nation but rather with the entity supplying the funds from
20 See WTO Secretariat, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Press/57, Oct. 9, 1996, at
6.
21 See International Monetary Fund, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 408 (1980).
22 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages 19, at http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir0love_a4.en.pdf, (last visited Feb. 15, 2002) [hereinafter World
Investment Report 2001] (stating that "the strongest channel for diffusing skills, knowledge,
and technology from foreign affiliates is the linkages they strike with local firms and institu-
tions").
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While the locus of management control for the foreign investor is in
the investment itself and not in the overall structure of the host economy,
there is a fear in developing nations that in order to attract foreign direct in-
vestment government policies will need to be catered to the demands of
foreign direct investors.24 Many developing nations are eager to attract in-
vestors,25 but they want to do so while retaining autonomy over policies
specific to the needs of their nation. 6 Indeed, the scope of the definition of
FDI favored by capital exporting countries over capital importing countries
illustrates this pattern of developing countries favoring control over as
much of their infrastructure as possible. Not surprisingly, the scope of the
definition of FDI favored by capital exporting countries is broader than that
of capital importing countries. Countries that invest their capital in foreign
markets want to ensure that the investment is protected, and therefore they
favor a broad definition of FDI that regulates and legally protects a range of
investments.27 In contrast, countries importing capital want to retain as
much of their own sovereignty as possible and therefore support "a narrow
definition of FDI in order to minimize their liberalization obligations in an
international agreement., 28 The tension surrounding the scope of the defi-
nition of FDI parallels tension in the legislation explored in latter sections
of this paper: broadly, there is a need to attract investors by offering reliable
and secure investment arenas, but specifically, there is a need to maintain
the autonomy of individual nations within Sub-Saharan Africa.29
23 See LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred
Escher eds., 1999).
24 See Akech, supra note 15, at 699-700. The article notes that it is possible that if FDI is
not regulated by the host country, it could actually be harmful rather than helpful to develop-
ing nations. In order to ensure that the benefits of FDI are diffused, governments need to
have the freedom to "establish a suitable regulatory framework to monitor foreign business
operations."
25 See Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multilat-
eral Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 498-99 (2001). (stating that the low
volatility and high potential for FDI to increase "healthy competition, increase exports, up-
grade local technology and management skills," likely influenced the decision of African
leaders at a conference in 1999 to conclude that FDI was an integral part of any development
strategy).
26 For an example of developing nations opting for "homegrown" economic policies over
those of multilateral institutions, see Nigerians to Withdraw from Accord with IMF, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/06/intemational/
africa/06LAGO.html?ex =1016399638&ei= 1 &en=3581 d63ecfaf9920.
27 See LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 27.
28 See id
29 See Sherif H. Seid, GLOBAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 27 (2002),
(noting that effective state intervention in foreign direct investment involves a government
matching its role to its capacity, focusing capabilities on tasks it can and should undertake).
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B. Global Status of FDI
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment ("UNCTAD"), 30 global flows of foreign investment are expanding
rapidly, making international production and the role of transnational cor-
porations ("TNCs") driving forces in the world economy.3' In 2000, FDI
surged by 18%, surpassing the growth figures of world production, capital
formation, and trade.32 While FDI increased in 2000, the overall flows of
FDI are expected to decline in 2001. The surge and the downfall of FDI
parallel the growth and decline of mergers and acquisitions ("M&A"),
which account for much of the worldwide flow of FDI.34
The primary destinations for FDI are within developed countries,
which receive three-fourths of the global inflows of FDI.35 Within devel-
oped nations, FDI is concentrated even further, with 71% of inward FDI go-
ing to "The Triad"--the United States, Japan, and the European Union.36
While the overall FDI flows to developing nations did rise to 240 billion
dollars in 2000, the overall percentage of incoming FDI to developing na-
tions actually dropped to 19% - a sharp decline from the peak-high 41%
reached in 1994. 37
While the last decade has witnessed an overall increase in foreign di-
rect investment to developing nations, Sub-Saharan Africa has represented
only a tiny portion of that investment.38 Moreover, while inflows of FDI to
Africa have risen since the mid-1990s, incoming FDI to Africa actually de-
clined in 2000 from 10.5 billion dollars to 9.1 billion dollars. 39 This drop
left Africa with less than 1% of the total incoming FDI globally.40 From the
statistics, including a new inward FDI index compiled by UNCTAD, FDI is
"unevenly distributed" 4' with Africa receiving "less FDI flows in compari-
son with the region's relative economic size.
4 2
30 UNCTAD is a United Nations organization that focuses on matters related to foreign









38 See Peter K. Nyikuli, Unlocking Africa's Potential: Some Factors Affecting Economic
Development and Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 623, 623
(1999).
39 See World Investment Report 2001, supra note 22, at 6.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 10.
42 Id. at 15.
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C. Factors Affecting Inflow of FDI to Developing Nations, Particularly
Sub-Saharan Africa
A survey done by UNCTAD in 1999 examining what industries in
Sub-Saharan Africa attracted investment indicated that telecommunications,
food and beverages, tourism, textiles and clothing, and mining and quarry-
ing were all potentially attractive investment sectors for foreigners. 43 De-
spite the fact that some FDI does reach these markets, the UNCTAD report
also noted that:
... in spite of the reforms that have taken place and the progress expected in a
number of African countries in terms of improving the business environment,
further work is needed to change the image of Africa and to develop among
foreign investors a more differentiated view of the continent and its opportuni-ties. 4
If a more "investment friendly image of developing nations" is to be
marketed to investors, the factors inhibiting investment need to be articu-
lated and then overcome. With respect to Sub-Saharan Africa in particular,
there are a host of barriers to investment that have been pinpointed by
scholars. Some of the factors that pose particular challenges include: a fear
of domestic law,45 uncertainty about the future of the reform process, debt
burdens (Africa's external debt is the highest of any developing region),
and sub-Saharan Africa's limited participation in the global trading sys-
tem.46 Further, a recent World Bank study that examined problems of pri-
vatization in Africa cited "lack of political commitment, poor design,
insufficient resources, weak management, and corruption'A7 as factors in-
hibiting privatization initiatives in the region. This same World Bank re-
port articulated the need for African governments to make their information
more transparent to the public, thereby ensuring their commitment to inves-
tors and their willingness to ensure accountability in the investment proc-
ess.
4 8
Most recently, UNCTAD's World Investment Report for 2001 noted
that drivers behind FDI are changing rapidly in response to changes in in-
ternational society.4 9 Many of the factors attracting FDI that were cited in
43 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the
Challenge of Development 24, at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir99ove.pdf (last visited
Feb. 16, 2001).
44 See id at 24-25.
45 See LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 27.
46 See Irving Williamson & Stephen D'Alessandro, New Prospects for Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus 637, 641 (1999).
41 See id. at 642.
48 id.
49 See World Investment Report 2001, supra note 22, at 17.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law& Business 23:213 (2002)
1999, such as large markets, natural resources, and access to unskilled la-
bor, have been replaced in UNCTAD's latest findings.50 The latest report
states that regionalism is of growing importance and notes that FDI brought
about by TNC activity "increasingly reflects development and policy liber-
alization, technological progress, and evolving corporate strategies" within
developing nations.51 UNCTAD asserts that developing nations must un-
derstand the need to not only liberalize their FDI policies, which many gov-
ernments have already done, but also to actively market their countries by
articulating their corporate strategy in an age of globalization.52
While it is essential that governments in developing nations create
policies to compensate for weak financial markets and institutions, there are
no "ready made prescriptions" for attracting investors. In order to benefit
from the linkages with TNCs, developing nations need to construct policies
that are "often highly context-specific and need to be adapted to the specific
circumstances prevailing in each country." 53 The next part of this paper
will illustrate the downfalls of applying uniform development programs to
developing nations, particularly countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, without
considering the nuances of each particular country. The suggestions of
UNCTAD and the lessons learned from the following examination of struc-
tural adjustment programs of multilateral lending institutions will then be
used in Parts III and IV as a springboard from which to analyze the United
States investment policy in the AGOA.
III. THE GRIM ECONOMIC PICTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZATIONS IMPOSED BY MULTILATERAL
LENDING INSTITUTIONS
Today we speak of globalization, but for a period of thirty years-from
the mid 1940s until the mid 1970s-the world economy experienced a rapid
expansion that is referred to as the "Golden Age". 54 During this period, the
industrialized economies grew at a rate of 5% annually.5 5 In order to man-
age this growth, which was nearly double the normal rate for industrialized
economies, three key international institutions emerged: the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank, and the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trades ("GATT").56 The IMF, World Bank, and GATT all had
independent but interrelated missions associated with promoting a liberal-
50 See id
51 id.
52 Id. at 19.
51 Id. at 22.
54 See DYING FOR GROWTH: GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND THE HEALTH OF THE POOR 18 (Jim
Yong Kim et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter DYING FOR GROWTH].
5 See id.561Id. at 19.
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ized trade agenda in an age of booming industrial expansion.57
The missions of the IMF and World Bank, collectively known as the
"Bretton Woods Institutions," were associated with promoting a liberalized
trade agenda. 58 Established in 1946, the IMF was created to prevent eco-
nomic crises like the Great Depression of the 1930s. 59 The IMF promotes
"international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly ex-
change arrangements.. .to foster economic growth.. .and to provide tempo-
rary financial assistance to countries to help ease the balance of payment
adjustments., 6' The World Bank, which started in 1946-47, was originally
established to aid reconstruction of economies devastated by the Second
World War.61 By 1948, the Bank's agenda shifted, and it began to provide
development loans to poor countries.62 Today, the Bank "has sharpened its
focus on poverty reduction as the overarching goal of its work. 6 3 Histori-
cally, the IMF's emphasis on short-term financial assistance distinguished it
from the World Bank, which focused more on providing medium to long
term financing for development. 64 Today, both institutions remain distinct
but work cooperatively on many financial matters in developing countries.
65
The Bretton Woods Institutions began to dominate the global financial
market during the debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s when developing na-
tions were unable to pay off their loans to commercial banks.66 The IMF
57 d.
58 The IMF and World Bank are often referred to collectively as the "Bretton Woods In-
stitutions" because plans for the two organizations were drafted at a conference in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire in July of 1949. See id.
59 See International Monetary Fund Web site, at http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
60 See id.
61 See The World Bank Web site, at http://www.worldbank.org/about/history/ (last visited
Feb. 15, 2002).
62 See DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 54 at 19.
63 See The World Bank Web site, supra note 61.
64 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social
Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 529, 572-73
(2000).
65 See Michel Chossudovsky, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY: IMPACTS OF IMF AND
WORLD BANK REFORMS 35 (1997); see also Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initia-
tive Factsheet, supra note 14, for one such example of this cooperation.
66 See DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 54, at 20. For a history of the debt crisis see
LIMITS OF ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, 1986-1994
at 6-7 (Poul Engberg-Pedersen et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter LIMITS OF ADJUSTMENT] (From
1973-1982 there was a "world wide monetary boom arising from petro dollar recycling.
This was associated with a burst of donor spending in many African countries, which blew
away the emerging macroeconomic constraints and set in motion as investment (or project)
boom ... the availability of donor funds also accelerated expansion of economic and social
infrastructure and services, with similar effects on efficiency, or rather its absence ... [in the]
early 80's there was worldwide retrenchment, declining terms of trade, tight money and
massively increased debt.").
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and World Bank, multilateral institutions controlled by the voting power of
a few select nations who were also substantial lenders, 67 were eager to pre-
vent a global financial crisis. Consequently, these institutions intervened in
the debt crisis and agreed to give nations funds to offset their debts as long
as they in turn agreed to restructure their economies.68 The restructuring
came in the form of loans that were conditioned on "macro economic struc-
tural adjustment policies that required painful reductions of budget deficits
and currency devaluations., 69 The structural adjustment policies, known as
"SAPs," promoted the neo-liberal trade ideology of "state retrenchment,
market liberalization, and liberalization of capital flows on a global scale. 7 °
The general idea behind structural adjustment programs was the notion that
debtor nations "submit their economies to international market forces
through privatization, [thus] opening up the economy to capital market
forces through privatization, offering more incentives to private foreign in-
vestment, and through policy reform.' In other words, free markets and
privatization initiatives, coupled with policies to attract investors, would
"solve" the financial problems of developing nations.
Structural adjustment programs were developed with little concern for
the unique problems associated with individual developing nations. 72 Pro-
gram reforms were fueled by several general policy guidelines including:
reductions in aggregate demand and government expenditure, expenditure
switching both within the government budget and through exchange rate
devaluation, reduction of trade barriers and controls, market and price liber-
alization, and institutional reform. 73 SAPs tended to be uniform from coun-
try to country, 74 imposing a top-down approach with little consideration for
the subtle nuances of each developing nations' culture and economy.
Moreover, the programs were wrought with conditions that forced govern-
ments to compromise public spending and social objectives in order to allo-
67 See DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 54, at 20.
68 See id.
69 See Sustainable Liberalism, supra note 18, at 389.
70 See Lopsided Rules of North-South Engagement: The African Growth Opportunity Act
at Part IV, at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/usafrica/toc.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2002) [hereinafter Lopsided Rules].
71 See Diana E. Moller, Intervention, Coercion or Justifiable Need? A Legal Analysis of
Structural Adjustment Lending in Costa Rica, 2 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 483, 501 (1995).
72 See BEYOND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN AFRICA: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND
THE ALTERNATIVES 3 (Kidane Mengisteab & B. Ikubolajeh Logan eds., 1995) [hereinafter
BEYOND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION N AFRICA].
" See id. at 139-140
74 See Mark Baker, Privatization in the Developing World: Panacea for the Economic Ills
of the Third World or Prescription Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 233, 253
(1999).
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cate more money to privatization initiatives and debt repayment7 5 Indeed,
SAPs prevented developing nations from having agency to solve discrete
problems specific to a single country.
Structural adjustment programs have been largely successful. They
were not developed specifically for individual nations and because they fa-
vored overwhelming privatization at the expense of public spending and in-
stitution building.76 A 1994 World Bank Report concluded that out of
twenty-nine adjusting African countries, only six were successful. 77 The
failure of structural adjustment programs founded on general rather than
context specific policies supports the latest findings of UNCTAD that "well
designed government intervention" and policies that are "adapted to the
specific circumstances prevailing in each host country" are needed to create
an environment which is favorable to investment. 78 General, sweeping re-
forms, like structural adjustment, are the very "ready made policy prescrip-
tions" that must be avoided.79
Like the IMF and World Bank, there are also lessons to be learned
from approaches of multilateral trade organizations. The GATT, which
also went into effect in 1947, was an integrated trade agreement signed by
twenty-three countries that sought to promote free trade on a global scale.8 °
In 1994, the rules governing international trade were strengthened at the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at the time the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") was created to replace the GATT.81 Notably,
the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were unable to assert their
own agency by participating in the negotiations at the Uruguay Round.82
Consequently, these countries have remained on the periphery of the current
global trading system, responding to rather than assisting in decisions made
by the global capital powers.83
The latest trade talks, launched in Doha, Qatar, are intended to recon-
cile this disparity between developed and developing nations.84 Coined as
the "development round" of world trade talks, the Doha meeting is expected
75 See generally id at 234.
76 See generally LIMITS OF ADJUSTMENT, supra note 66.
77 See George B.N. Ayittey, How the Multilateral Institutions Compounded Africa's Eco-
nomic Crisis, 30 LAW AND POL'Y INT'L Bus. 585, 593 (1999) ("[T]he failure rate of eighty
percent would have been even higher had Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Tanzania been ex-
cluded in light of recent developments.").
78 World Investment Report 2001, supra note 22, at 16-17.
79 See discussion of UNCTAD recommendations for FDI in developing nations infra Part
II.C.
80 See DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 54, at 19.
81 See Williamson & D'Alessandro, supra note 46, at 644.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 See Brainard, supra note 9, at 19.
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to launch a new dialogue concerning how to bring the benefits of globaliza-
tion to poor countries. 85 Indeed, in the WTO's Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion released in November 2001, the WTO pledges the following with
respect to fostering the relationship between trade and development:
We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for en-
hanced support for technical assistance and capacity building in this area, in-
cluding policy analysis and development so that they may better evaluate the
implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies
and objectives, and human and institutional development. To this end, we
shall work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organizations,
including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels,
to provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to
these needs.86
The Doha trade talks are a step in the right direction with respect to
global trade discussions. They mark a shift toward embracing the perspec-
tive of developing nations by including them in discussions rather than im-
posing trade and development mandates without thorough consultation.
Indeed, the notion of "selective globalization" is dwindling in the face of a
rapidly changing society, and there is a new recognition for the essential
need to decrease the divide between the rich and poor. The next two sec-
tions of this paper will examine the United States' response to this new
global reality by analyzing the African Growth Opportunity Act.
IV. POLICY BEHIND AFRICAN GROWTH OPPORTUNITY ACT AIMS TO
INCREASE PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. Presidential Trade Initiative for Africa
On June 17, 1997 President Clinton announced the "Partnership for
Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa," a piece of legislation stem-
ming from agreements reached at the Uruguay Trade Agreements concern-
ing African trade and development initiatives. 87 This new initiative sought
to shift the US policy outlook towards Africa from one of passive ambiva-
lence to a strategy aimed to capitalize on sub-Saharan Africa's reforming
and burgeoning economies. This would be accomplished by building
strong trade relationships, promoting private sector investment, and invest-
85 See id.
86 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(0 1)/DEC/i at § 21
(adopted on 14 Nov. 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ministe/
min01 e/mindecl e.htm#tradeinvestment.
87 See Robert H. Edwards Jr. et al., International Investment, Development, and Privati-
zation, 35 INT'L LAW. 383, 384 (2001).
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ing in people, health and education 88 The policy shift was triggered, not by
the humanitarian "Doha development" agenda of today, but largely because
the United States, a country accustomed to dominating the global market-
place, trailed behind both France and Britain with only a 7% share of the
industrial country supplies to sub-Saharan Africa.
89
B. Congressional Response to African Trade Initiative
On May 18, 2000, Congress passed the Trade and Development Act of
2000,90 which contained the African Growth Opportunity Act9' (hereinafter
"AGOA"). The AGOA complemented the Clinton Administration's Afri-
can Trade Initiative and ensured that key elements of the trade and devel-
opment policy would be implemented.92
The Congressional findings articulated in § 102 of the AGOA reiterate
policy statements made by the Clinton Administration in 1997 (when the
"Partnership for Economic Opportunity in Africa" was first announced).
The Clinton Administration's objective was to eliminate barriers to free
trade in an effort to increase foreign investment and gain market share in
the industrial supplier sector of the Sub-Saharan African economy.93 Sub-
sections 8 and 9 of § 102 indicate that Congress favored the Clinton Ad-
ministration's neo-liberal trade agenda. In those provisions, Congress
found:
(8) increased trade and investment flows have the greatest impact in an eco-
nomic environment in which trading partners eliminate barriers to trade and
capitalflows and encourage the development of a vibrant private sector that of-
fers individual African citizens the freedom to expand their economic opportu-
nities and provide for their families.
(9) offering the countries of sub-Saharan Africa enhanced trade preferences
will encourage both higher levels of trade and direct investment in support of
the positive economic and political developments under way throughout the
region.94
88See id.
89 See Presidential Report, A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the
Countries of Africa, Dec. 1997, at 9, at www.ustr.gov/pdf/africa98.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2002) [hereinafter A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy].9 0 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, at Introduction ("[The Act sought]
to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa, expand trade benefits
to the countries of the Caribbean Basin, renew the generalized system of preferences, and
reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance programs.").
"' Id. at Title 1.
92 See Edwards et al., supra note 87, at 384.
93 See Akech, supra note 15, at 652.
94 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 102 (emphasis added).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law& Business 23:213 (2002)
The locus of policy behind the AGOA is embedded in a mission to en-
hance trade and increase investment. Implicit in provisions 8 and 9 of the
Act, however, there is a political agenda that promotes limited government
and an economic agenda favoring virtually limitless privatization. A 1997
Presidential report to Congress on the subject of African trade and devel-
opment policy states, in very explicit terms, that on the subject of "im-
proved policy management and governance, the Administration attaches
importance to policies aimed at streamlining and reducing the scope of gov-
ernment activities .... These policy statements dangerously parallel de-
velopment agendas imposed by multilateral institutions in structural
adjustment programs that have proven to be ineffective. 96 While it is com-
mendable to promote improved policies and governance in Africa, and
while such improvements will help to stimulate interest in investing in Sub-
Saharan Africa, there is also a fine-line between establishing trade incen-
tives and agenda setting through "good governance" programming.
The impetus for creating the AGOA was founded on the notion that in-
vestors need to feel more comfortable in a place - sub-Saharan Africa - that
is so intrinsically different from their home environments. Yet, despite the
broad differences in the culture, history, and experience of African nations,
Congress continues to look at the countries and development issues in Af-
rica through an American lens of experience that does not offer the best
means of creating a brighter image (or reality) for Sub-Saharan Africa.
Section 102(7) of the AGOA is a perfect illustration of this all too Ameri-
can development perspective:
(7) trade and investment, as the American experience has shown, can represent
powerful tools both for economic development and for encouraging broader
participation in a political process in which political freedom can flourish.97
Although it is certainly not unfounded for Congress to cite trade and
investment as significant contributors to the success of the United States, it
is wrong to use the American experience as a foundation for African trade
and development policy. As one critic has noted, "[t]he right of all sover-
eign countries to articulate their own developmental perspectives based on
their history, experience, and goals is a notion that is completely absent
from the letter and spirit of the Act., 98
Some of the policy behind the AGOA is unfortunately too couched in
the "American capitalist experience." There are several more policy
justifications behind the Act that are not only neutral, but that also hit the
95 A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy, supra note 89, at 5-6.
96 See supra Part I1I for discussion on SAPs.
97 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 102 (emphasis added).
98 See Lopsided Rules, supra note 70.
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cations behind the Act that are not only neutral, but that also hit the very
points that investors have noted as reasons why they are wary to invest in
sub-Saharan Africa. These initiatives, again, articulated by the Clinton
Administration in a report to Congress, include "increasing professionalism,
transparency and accountability of the public sector, and developing a judi-
cial system in which published rules are impartially applied and for which
appeal procedures are in place." 99 As these more universal policies illus-
trate, certain provisions of the AGOA are rooted in a foundation that can
help increase FDI in sub-Saharan Africa.
Tthe Administration and Congress did not understand that in order for
their neo-liberal trade objectives to succeed, privatization initiatives will
have to be catered to the nuances of the governments and economies of sub-
Saharan African nations. The policy cannot be one of top-down privatiza-
tion initiatives that have proven successful in the United States. 00 The next
part of this paper will explore which parts of the AGOA strike a balance be-
tween liberalization and cooperation with developing governments. Under-
standing the particular economic, social, and cultural environments of each
sub-Saharan African country, and working though dialogue and selective
government intervention to make reforms will likely succeed in fostering an
environment that will bring more FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa.
V. THE AFRICAN GROWTH OPPORTUNITY ACT'S ROLE IN INCREASING FDI
FLOWS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A. AGOA Provisions with Positive Implications for FDI
Several provisions of the AGOA strike a balance between advocating
market liberalization and accounting for particularities unique to Sub-
Saharan African nations. These provisions, which this article contends will
aid in making the region more attractive to investors because they will lead
to sustainable liberalization. Such provisions cover issues of regionalism,
dispute resolution, dialogue between nations, worker rights, and attention to
particular development issues, especially those related to health, that are
dire in sub-Saharan Africa today.
In § 103 of the AGOA, Congress notes support for "expanding United
States assistance to sub-Saharan Africa's regional integration efforts."''
This provision of the AGOA recognizes the importance of fostering alli-
99 A Comprehensive Trade and Development, supra note 89, at 6.1oo See Seid, supra note 29, at 30 ("[I]n order to realize the full potential of FDI, it may be
necessary for any government to have an interventionist role and adopt a policy that is selec-
tive with respect to projects and the volume and timing of FDI inflows ... Liberalization
should also be seen as a continuous movement, rather than a one-off radical measure."101 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 103(3).
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ances in sub-Saharan Africa that will assist the region in developing an in-
ternal market. Such regional markets have been cited by UNCTAD as a
means of fostering attractive areas for FDI because regional markets have
the potential to create platforms from which African countries can negotiate
with the global capital powerhouses. 0 2 In addition, African economies
seek to benefit strategically from regional alliances: "Developing countries
which join major regional arrangements will become more attractive loca-
tions for foreign investors. Their attraction will reflect assured access to
export markets and more visible and credible hospitable policies towards
foreign firms."' 0 3 Promoting regional alliances in sub-Saharan Africa will
not only make the markets more visible, but also encourage nations to be
more autonomous and enable them to create transparent networks of infor-
mation that ensure accountability. By bolstering African nations from
within, regional integration efforts require African nations to become more
familiar with the global trading network from their own perspective, and in
turn create an environment that is more conducive to both foreign and do-
mestic investment. 
04
As mentioned earlier, studies of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa cited fear
of national laws, debt burdens, corruption, and poor infrastructure and man-
agement as just some of the factors inhibiting investment in the region.10 5
The AGOA addresses many of these concerns in the eligibility require-
ments, thereby offering investors added assurances that their concerns will
be either alleviated or lessened when they know they are dealing with a
country that is eligible for the benefits of the AGOA. To qualify for assis-
tance under the AGOA, governments must protect private property rights,
provide national provisions for the resolution of bilateral trade and invest-
ment disputes, expand physical infrastructure, and protect worker rights.'06
Indeed, if sub-Saharan governments meet the multitude of eligibility re-
quirements imposed by the AGOA, they will be required to work towards
the kind of liberalized, efficient, transparent, and accountable environment
that foreign investors desire.
While some of the foundational polices behind the AGOA give too
much credence to the "American experience," the Act does create a Coop-
eration Forum to promote the free exchange of ideas between nations.'0 7
102 See World Investment Report 2001, supra note 22, at 17.
103 See John H. Dunning, THE NEW GLOBALISM AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs 72-73
(1997), at http://emedia.netlibrary.com.
04 See Nyikuli, supra note 38, at 648.
'
05 See id. at 641.
106 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 104.
107 The first Cooperation Forum was held in Washington DC on Oct. 29-30. A report of
the forum is available at http://www.agoa.gov/AGOAUpdate/agoa-update.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2002). Notably, President Bush's remarks at the Forum were couched in language
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Such a provision is essential because it enables the United States to partici-
pate in an ongoing dialogue with nations of sub-Saharan Africa about what
they believe is the best way to enhance trade, development, and foreign in-
vestment in their region. The requirements for the "United States-Sub-
Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum" are outlined in §
105 of the AGOA, and not only include ongoing discussions between high
level government officials, but also encourage meetings and discussions be-
tween nongovernmental organizations and private sector representatives
from the United States and countries of sub-Saharan Africa. 08 Participating
in ongoing dialogues gives the African countries the kind of autonomy and
agency they need if they are going to be part of the global trade arena.
Moreover, because the Act seeks to encourage the exchange of ideas, not
only at the government level, but also between private sector parties and
NGOs, the range of topics and perspectives should be broad enough to cap-
ture the myriad of issues that need to be addressed in order to adequately re-
form the investment environment.
In addition to fostering dialogue under the auspices of the Cooperation
Forum, the AGOA also creates new, specialized positions for a trade repre-
sentative and additional commercial service employees to be stationed in
sub-Saharan Africa. Section 117 of the AGOA establishes an "Assistant
United States Trade Representative for African Affairs" who will serve as
"a primary point of contact in the executive branch for those persons en-
gaged in trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa."'0 9 Fur-
thermore, the Congress calls for the Secretary of Commerce to take steps to
create "(1) at least 20 full-time Commercial Service employees [who] are
stationed in sub-Saharan Africa; and (2) full-time Commercial Service em-
ployees [who] are stationed in not less than 10 different sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries." '" 0 Direct contact with the executive branch via the Trade
Representative for African Affairs coupled with additional commercial ser-
vice employees in a range of African countries will offer investors assur-
ances that any concerns or problems they have in Africa can be addressed
by personnel specifically designated to deal with the challenging issues
specific to sub-Saharan Africa. Knowing that such onsite communication
and reporting channels exist should ease investors' fears and alleviate some
of the resistance to foreign direct investment in the region.
Many provisions of the AGOA are couched in terms of trade and eco-
against the war on terrorism, thereby illustrating what has become an undeniable link be-
tween "selective globalization" and the roots of terrorism. President Bush thanked the Afri-
can countries for their support against terrorists, then pledged $200 million to OPIC, pledged
to create a Trade and Development Agency in Johannesburg, and announced the Trade for
African Development and Enterprise Program.
108 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 105.
109 Id. § l17(A).I" Id. § 125(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
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nomic development, and the free market ideology behind the AGOA is un-
deniable. However, having a free market ideology behind the Act does not
mean that development initiatives for sub-Saharan Africa are completely
ignored in favor of creating incentives for the private sector. The AGOA,
albeit to a limited extent and more often than not under the auspices of cre-
ating a more "liberalized environment," does advocate that privatization
and market liberalization initiatives be met with a commitment to promot-
ing development in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the Act has an entire
provision dedicated to encouraging businesses to "provide assistance to
sub-Saharan African countries to prevent and reduce the incidence of
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa."' 11 The Act also instructs participants in
the Cooperation Forum to review "the HIV/AIDS epidemic in each sub-
Saharan African country.""
2
Development initiatives, as well as investment and free trade policies,
need to account for the unique cultural, historical, social, and economic
situation in each and every one of the forty-eight countries of sub-Saharan
Africa. The task is daunting, which is evidenced by the fact that the AGOA
groups all the countries together under the category of sub-Saharan Africa.
While new attention to the region in terms of investment, trade, and devel-
opment is encouraging, each country's economic and development prob-
lems must be taken into consideration on an individual basis if any kind of
trade or development is to be sustained.
B. Shortcomings of the AGOA
The AGOA takes affirmative steps through initiatives like the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Forum, commercial service employees, and calls to
study health and education. To understand the nuances of each of the coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa, however, the neo-classical trade ideology that
underlines the Act ultimately seeks to attain the uniform objective of pro-
moting free and open markets as fast as possible and with as little govern-
ment intervention as possible. This "top-down" approach dangerously
mirrors the conditions of structural adjustment programs imposed by the
IMF and World Bank that have failed miserably.1" 3 Moreover, a sweeping
reform agenda fails to advocate the selective intervention by governments
proposed by UNCTAD 1 4 and instead favors a wholesale market liberaliza-
tion initiative, irrespective of the country at hand. The AGOA, because it
favors such quick, sweeping liberalization, fails to account for the fact that
many African nations are unable to provide the ingredients necessary for a
1 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 128.
: 
21d. § 105(e).
113 See supra Part II, discussion of SAPs.
114 See World Investment Report 2001, supra note 22, at 21.
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free market to operate effectively."l 5 A strategy of liberalization coupled
with protectionism has been cited as one of the reasons for the success in
the emerging East Asian markets." 16 The AGOA, rather than push for an
aggressive privatization plan, should instead focus on creating free markets
while allowing selective government intervention by the nations of Sub-
Saharan Africa. In order for the liberalization favored by the Clinton and
Bush Administrations to succeed in Africa, governments in the host nations
must be allowed to intervene in their own development efforts, and devel-
oped nations must be prepared "to assist [these] developing states to create
the economic, legal and physical conditions required by a properly func-
tioning market."" 7 The key to sustainable growth, and hence a more attrac-
tive environment for FDI, is a collaborative effort on the part of both the
developed and developing nations, along with selective intervention by host
governments in their own development strategy.
Although the majority of eligibility requirements under the Act are
beneficial and, as the US Commerce Department states, "standards which
Africans themselves have espoused and most are striving to uphold,' 18 the
eligibility requirements for privatization initiatives in relation to govern-
ment intervention are too stringent. The first eligibility requirement "mini-
mizes government interference in the economy through measures such as
price controls, subsidies, and government ownership of economic assets."'"19
While the objective of this requirement is to prevent covert government
protectionism, 120 the use of the term "interference" indicates that Congress
sees any government involvement as a hindrance to development rather
than something that could be used to foster market growth. Once again, this
universal favoritism for all things private goes against recommendations in
the latest UNCTAD study. 12 1 Moreover, the radical and rapid privatization
approach advocated in § 104 of the AGOA is completely contrary to the se-
lective role of government that has been cited as a factor in the development
"15 See generally World Investment Report 2001, supra note 22, at 21.
116 See David Katona, Challenging the Global Structure Through Self Determination: An
African Perspective, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1439, 1450 (1999). A recent World Bank re-
port cited four main factors that contributed to the success of the economies in the region:
"macroeconomic stability, extensive investment in social infrastructure, efficient export push
efforts, and selective government intervention." Id.117 Sustainable Liberalism, supra note 18, at 398.
118 See United States Department of Commerce, FAQ Sheet on the AGOA, at http://
www.agoa.gov/FAQ/faq.html (last visited on Feb. 19, 2002).
119 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, at § 104(A).
120 The idea of covert protectionism is that protected economies become corrupt systems
that help only those with clout and/or affluence and therefore do not diffuse growth to those
who need it most, namely the poor. See generally Seid, supra note 29, at 26.
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of East Asian Economies.12 2 Further, such liberalization polices promote
the idea that "the 'invisible hand' of market forces is the only viable and
desirable path to development."1 23 African nations need a "hands on" ap-
proach, not the invisible hand of private market forces.
The AGOA's demanding and fast-paced privatization requirements are
linked with an even more sweeping amount of executive discretion. The
freedom given to the executive is outlined in § 104. The President is in
charge of determining which countries are eligible for benefits of the
AGOA, monitoring and review of those selected countries, and terminating
benefits given to countries who are not continuing in compliance.1 24 The
executive is given exclusive authority to make decisions on three levels
with no Congressional or other checks and balances imposed on his discre-
tion. Such a broad base of power is vulnerable to the pull of the political
tide, which leaves all the nations of sub-Saharan Africa in a precarious posi-
tion: not only are the nations vulnerable to oscillating markets, but also to
radical shifts in executive decision making based in highly politicized envi-
ronments. 125 Moreover, investors may be hesitant to put their capital in na-
tions that are subject to radical changes in policy based on a swift,
unchecked Presidential decision.
26
Although determination of eligibility and benefits for sub-Saharan na-
tions under the AGOA is left solely to the discretion of the executive, there
are other provisions that advocate a collaborative effort on the part of Con-
gress and the President. One of those areas most relevant to creating an en-
vironment for FDI is the focus on economic and development related
issues. In § 121 of the AGOA Congress acknowledges the immense debt of
122 See Akech, supra note 15, at 693.
123 See id. at 690.
124 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 104.
125 To grasp the highly politicized nature of trade relations in Africa consider the title of
President Bush's comments to the African Growth and Opportunity Forum: "U.S., Africa
Strengthen Counter-Terrorism and Economic Ties, Remarks by the President to the African
Growth and Opportunity Forum." The full text of President Bush's comments is available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011029-2.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2002).
126 It should be noted that some scholars believe that unchecked Presidential authority is a
benefit, rather than a detriment because the President is less susceptible to the influence of
interest groups. See John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movesian, The World Trade Constitu-
tion, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 539-540 (2000). McGinnis and Movesian, albeit with respect
to free trade and not FDI, argue that members of Congress are susceptible to interest group
pressures against trade, particularly because they work in small committees and may feel the
concentrated pressure of voters in their districts. The President, on the other hand, has a "na-
tional constituency not tied to particular localities and their interest groups." With respect to
FDI, I would assert that powerful TNCs are the very kind of national powerhouse interest
groups with substantial influence over party funding that have a profound influence on cam-
paign financing and therefore electoral urgency for the President. Indeed, I would assert that
the President is more, not less, susceptible to interest group pressure with respect to FDI.
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many nations in sub-Saharan Africa, then asserts the following two initia-
tives under the AGOA:
(1) Congress and the President should work together, without undue delay and
in concert with the international community, to make comprehensive debt re-
lief available to the world's poorest countries in a manner that promotes eco-
nomic growth and poverty alleviation;
(2) this program of bilateral and multilateral debt relief should be designed to
strengthen and expand the private sector, encourage increased trade and in-
vestment, support the development of free markets, and promote broad-scale
economic growth in beneficiary countries.1
27
The Congressional intent to alleviate debtrelief is certainly commend-
able, but an approach couched solely in the language of privatization is in-
correct, especially knowing the history of failed debt relief programs under
the auspices of structural adjustment initiated by the World Bank and
IMF.128 Debt relief and sustainable development cannot be achieved with-
out "policies that actively seek to engage the people in the adjustment proc-
ess and aim for the social advancement and economic transformation
(empowerment) of the poor.. . as an explicit objective."' 129 While it is es-
sential to have a commitment from Washington to assist in the debt relief in
sub-Saharan Africa, it is imperative that Washington not micro-manage the
continent. "0 Congress needs to allow Africans to work through their own
governments in order to seek their own solutions to their own problems.' 
3 1
History has shown that investors are attracted to developing countries that
can offer a solid infrastructure to foreign firms. 132 Even if the infrastructure
is initiated by private actors, the people of sub-Saharan Africa need to be
educated and trained in order for such development to be sustained.
VI. CONCLUSION: AFRICA'S PROSPECTS FOR ATTRACTING SUSTAINABLE
FDI UNDER THE AGOA
The nations of sub-Saharan Africa are so heavily in debt that it is criti-
cal for them to attract long-term capital flows from foreign investors.
3 3
127 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 17, § 121(b).
128 See generally supra Part I1.
129 See BEYOND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN AFRICA, supra note 72, at 147.
130 See Nyikuli, supra note 38, at 588.
131 One of a number of reasons that has been noted for the shift in attitude of developing
countries from confrontation to compromise with respect to foreign direct investment is that
colonial history is less of an issue and "attitudes towards FDI have become more pragmatic
in the former colonies." See Seid, supra note 29, at 17.
132 See Dunning, supra note 103, at 37.
133 See Nyikuli, supra note 38, at 629.
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Foreign direct investment could potentially enable developing nations to in-
crease the total flow of savings in their economies, and thereby begin to
erode their debt and focus funds on social programs that could sustain de-
velopment in the long term. FDI has numerous advantages for sub-Saharan
Africa:
... it is more stable and less volatile than short-term foreign portfolio invest-
ment; it adds to a country's gross capital formation, and it brings further spin-
off benefits in terms of transferring production technology, promoting material
expertise, improving the quality of human resources, and increasing knowledge
of and access to global markets. 134
It is undeniable that Africa needs to eliminate its aura of uncertainty
and become a region ripe for foreign direct investment. In the immediate
sense, the AGOA is well designed to eliminate the mystique surrounding
sub-Saharan Africa in such a way as to attract investors and make them feel
"at home" in the region.' 35 The broad discretion given to the executive,
which this article critiqued for not having checks and balances, can be seen
as a direct means of getting the benefits out to as many sub-Saharan nations
as possible, with as little bureaucracy as possible. The Economic Coopera-
tion Forum, trade representatives, and commercial service employees will
all encourage dialogue between the nations of sub-Saharan Africa and the
United States. Further, U.S. support for regional integration efforts will
help nations in sub-Saharan Africa realize their autonomy and work to-
gether to gain ownership of their trade, development, and investment inter-
ests through a unified platform.
It has been noted that incoming FDI "will not be sustained either in
small-export based economies or in large relatively protected markets,
unless national policies ensure that the basis for international production
and exchange is supported by improvements in infrastructure, skills, ser-
vices and the political and business environment."'' 36 While privatization
initiatives will likely help sub-Saharan African nations build infrastructures
that will attract investment, this infrastructure will be futile unless Africans
are educated and understand how to manage and sustain it. The private and
public sectors need to work together in ways to help Africans. Government
action cannot be construed as "interference" with privatization. In fact, the
private sector will unlikely sustain itself in Africa unless governments are
134 See Akech, supra note 15, at 697.
135 The U.S. Dept. of Commerce has established an informative and easily navigable
website for the AGOA: http://www.agoa.gov/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002). In ad-
dition to many other links, the site provides Q/A for both Sub-Saharan African countries and
investors..
136 Dunning, supra note 103, at 183.
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allowed to "interfere" with corruption, growing poverty, declining health
care, and poor educational systems. The AGOA, though a step in the right
direction, falls notably short of its goals when it imposes the "American ex-
perience" of quick, sweeping, neo-liberal trade policies on African nations
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